Caesar as a military commander

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Caesar as a military commander

Postby Horatius Piscinus on Thu Jun 10, 2004 4:01 pm

Salvete commilites

Over in Ancient Worlds I made a comment that I thought Julius Caesar was a terrible general. Challenged to back up that statement I will be posting my argument there, and thought I would post here for additional comments. I began with the matter of his logistics

The size of any combat force, in any age, is determined by logistics.
As Napoleon put it, "an army marches on its stomach." No matter how
sophisticated the logistics organization, there are limits to how many
men it can feed and supply, and that number decreases geometrically
with the distance over which supplies must be moved. A poor supply
system affects an army's discipline, and thus its potential combat
effectiveness, as soldiers will find means to compensate for anything
the logistics system fails to provide. Poorly organized, the
logistics system can become a liability, decreasing the army's
mobility. Neglecting to secure one?s logistics makes an army severely
vulnerable. Caesar paid little regard to his logistics. At times it
made his army needlessly vulnerable, whether through his own or enemy
actions. It repeatedly caused him to withdraw along his line of march
or delay his movements, severely reducing his mobility. He exposed
his men to additional danger by not providing proper security to his
logistics, and would cause him to then detach additional combat units
to recover his logistics or else withdraw.

Exempla illustre

"Though, as will become apparent, Caesar fully appreciated the value
of speed, because of his primitive method of supply, not one of his
campaigns, nor even that of any other Roman general, can compare with
Antigonus? in 319BCE, against Alcetas. ... Antigonus moved his whole
army, horse foot and elephants, about 50,000 men in all, at an average
of 41 miles a day for seven days on end (J. F. C. Fuller)." From
Aquileia to the Rhone Caesar?s army averaged 15 Roman miles per day.
That is, his three most proficient veteran legions at Aquileia, for
the better part of their journey moving along the Via Postumnia, did
not come up to the standard of 21 miles a day. Caesar's march from
Vesonita to Bibrax in 57 prompted him to write, "I had marched more
quickly than anyone imagined possible, so my arrival was unexpected,"
managing to make 10 miles a day (BG 2.3). Obviously the Gauls were
aware that without proper transport, when Caesar marched, his men
carrying their own barest supplies as 'Marius' mules,' that he was
exceptionally slow even for a Roman army.

No where in his Commentaries does Caesar mention the use of carts to
carry supply. Plutarch wrote of Pompeius, that he "supplied himself
with provisions and beasts of burden and wagons and everything else an
army requires." When Marius set out on his African campaign he loaded
his ships with "Provisions, money, arms and other necessities,"
providing himself with a logistics support that was "a considerably
greater contingent than the troops he had been authorized (Sallust,
Jurgurtha 86)." In comparison Caesar's first expedition to Britannia
sent two legions plus cavalry without any food rations or other
supplies. Napoleon commented that Caesar?s was "a second-rate
operation." He did not learn from his mistakes either. With only two
legions and about 800 horse he sailed to Alexandria, "without supplies
of any kind and ill prepared (Suetonius Div. Iul. 35)." He intended
to sail from Sicily to North Africa with no more than a single legion
of raw recruits and 600 horse, without provisions, and was prevented
from doing so only because of storms. When his other legions finally
arrived he then set sail with little or no provisions once more.

Upon hearing that the Helvetii were crossing the Saone, Caesar
"immediately broke camp" and followed in pursuit. Misinformation
prevented Caesar from attacking the Helvetii at Toulon-sur-Arroux, and
lack of supplies then forced him to withdraw 18 miles to Bibracte.
Taken by surprise by the Usipetes and Tencteri, Caesar "set out for
the army earlier than was his wont." The same occurred in North
Africa. Caesar initially landed with a small force, advanced before
he had consolidated his forces, without any provision for securing
supplies, and as a result had to withdraw from Leptis Minor back to
Ruspina. Again acting on misinformation, "the rumour, so it would
seem, opened Caesar?s eyes to the situation his impetuosity had placed
him in." On his retreat, he sent messengers to Sardinia, Sicily and
elsewhere, seeking corn and supplies; and he sent Sallustius to
Cercina "because he had heard that a great quantity of corn was to be
found there." When he returned to Ruspina he then ordered the
townsfolk "that all their carts and draught animals must go with him,"
so that he could forage the countryside (The African War 9). Through
his own negligence Caesar had wasted time, and not only had to
backtrack along his line of march but also backpedal to secure
supplies he should have provided for his legions in the first place.

In addition to his strategic blunders in not properly preparing for
campaigns, Caesar often neglected security for his logistics during
his operations, causing him additional problems. Two days after their
conference, Ariovistus moved his camp to within six miles of Caesar's.
The following day Ariovistus again moved, past Caesar, to set up camp
along Caesar's line of communication, threatening to cut Caesar's
supplies. Caesar had done nothing to prevent it, and then wasted five
days trying to draw Ariovistus into battle, and only when this proved
unsuccessful did he finally try to secure his supply line by splitting
his forces. Predictably Ariovistus attacked the smaller force that
Caesar had sent to guard his supply lines. He did not learn his
lesson when he went against the Nervii, and again in Britannia, lack
of supplies and an unsecured line of communication forced him to
recall his pursuit of Cassivellanus. "Caesar's negligence, which went
far to wreck the campaign at its start, is hard to explain (J. F. C.
Fuller)." In Africa and again in Spain his negligence of security
allowed the Pompeians to harass his lines of communications.

The officer primarily responsible for a Roman army's logistics was the
quaestor. Caesar had served as quaestor in Spain under C. Antistius
Vetus with little if any experience in supplying an army. His
campaign in Lusitania was conducted as a raid, moving from village to
village and supplying his army through plunder. Besides the
particular campaigns mentioned above, Caesar exhibited the same
mentality throughout his career, never really adjusting his logistics.
Circumstances forced him at times to adopt a system of
requisitioning, sending out his auxiliary cavalry under tribuni
militarium to locate supplies from local sources. But this was always
an ad hoc operation conducted as an afterthought when his negligence
proved a hindrance. The most vulnerable part of a military force is
its logistics, as Caesar should have known, because by accident he had
forced the surrender of the Helvetii when he cut off their supplies.
He consistently neglected to provide security to his foraging parties
in Gaul, soliciting guerilla attacks that needlessly cost his men's
lives. He consistently neglected providing security for his lines of
communications, making his entire force vulnerable to enemy attack.
Labienus, knowing his own commander well, conducted his own campaign
against Caesar?s supply lines, harassing his men with guerilla
tactics, that even Caesar admitted he was not prepared for. Delays at
Ilerda and in North Africa, and complications at Alexandria were all
due to Caesar?s failures in regards to procuring supplies and then in
neglecting to proved security for his logistics. Caesar's neglect of
his logistics has to then be placed next to what he did do, or
attempted to do, to see how other errors in judgement were complicated
by questions of supplying his troops, and how this then contributed to
needless losses to his troops. Of the nearly 6,000 men originally
recruited in Spain for Legio X, by Munda there were less than 2,000
men. Another veteran unit raised in Spain and used for Caesar's first
venture to Britannia, Legio VII was so reduced by his mishandling that
it had to be combined with another legion just to form a line at
Pharsalia. Poor logistics was not the only cause, but it was a main
component that led Caesar into situations for which these units paid a
high price, situations that a better general would have prevented
through proper preparations.
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Postby Gnaeus Dionysius Draco on Thu Jun 10, 2004 6:03 pm

Salve Piscine,

I remember back from the old Topica days that you think Caesar was a poor general. However, even with the information you provide us with, how do you explain his victories? Although he may not have been the most brilliant strategist, he did conquer Gallia. I'd have a hard time believing that this would have been through luck and coincidence entirely.

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Postby Quintus Pomponius Atticus on Thu Jun 10, 2004 7:02 pm

Salvete,

Reading this interesting, 'myth-debunking', posting, I am reminded of something I suggested in the past but never received any reaction back then. Perhaps we could start a new group project, in the Collegium Historicum then, about the great 'myths' in the representation of the Ancient World. All too often after all, tv documentaries, school textbooks etc. repeat a number of long corrected mistakes or outdated interpretations.

Perhaps we could integrate our upcoming "Gracchi project" (http://www.societasviaromana.org/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=680) in this framework as well ?

If a few others, say 5 sodales, would be willing to join in, I would volunteer to write something about misunderstandings concerning slavery in the Imperium Romanum. And those who are not sure they want to write anything themselves, but have a good topic in mind, pray tell it anyway.

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Postby Gnaeus Dionysius Draco on Thu Jun 10, 2004 11:28 pm

I might consider debunking the genocide myths about Rome, which I already partially did in my refutation of a fascist view of Rome. So, count me in for now.

When I have time, I'm going to update that (and other) essay(s), perhaps this summer, if I'm not having any re-exams.

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Postby Marcus Pomponius Lupus on Fri Jun 11, 2004 12:23 am

Salve Attice,

It's not really debunking, but I might add something about the life of Juvenalis, little is know about it really and I had to make an essay about it two years ago. I found it rather interesting, something worth translating from Dutch and adding a few things since then.

And if I don't have any re-exams as well, I could write something about Lucanus too, though my original essay (in Dutch again) turned out to be 14 pages, so it might take some time :wink:

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Postby Horatius Piscinus on Fri Jun 11, 2004 11:19 am

Salvete Draco et commilites omnes

Gnæus Dionysius Draco wrote:I remember back from the old Topica days that you think Caesar was a poor general. However, even with the information you provide us with, how do you explain his victories? Although he may not have been the most brilliant strategist, he did conquer Gallia. I'd have a hard time believing that this would have been through luck and coincidence entirely.


A good officer is one who can accomplish the mission with the least amount of losses. A good general is one who can accomplish those goals by utilizing and coordinating his forces effectively to accheive an objective with the least amount of losses. Caesar's neglect of his logistics is just the beginning of where failure as a good general. But successful he was.

Caesar was uncommonly lucky, the Gods favoured him, and one problem with Caesar is that too often he trusted in that more than good generalship. Caesar had one exceptional talent, an ability to select good lieutenents. Why Caesar was successful was because of two basic things. First though, a definition: an Effective Combat Force is determined by (1) the number of combat ready personal and equipment, (2) organized to work together as a single effective unit, (3) trained to employ tactics that most efficiently deploys combat strength. Caesar was fortunate enough to be commanding a Roman army. Its organization and tactics made it superior to any barbarian forces he faced, even to the point of overcoming his military blunders. Secondly, his success comes down to his having had good junior officers, down to centurians. A Roman general said that it took 8 years to make a legion into an effective combat force. Caesar entered Gaul with three veteran legions originally organized in Spain, two by Pompeius and one himself while propraetor in Baetica. What saved Caesar more often than not was the sturdiness of these veteran units, and the initiative of his junior officers. His very best officer was Labienus, and Caesar was wise enough to use him effectively. Against Ariovistus, Caesar had effectively taken himself out of command of his army, as he would often do, and it was Publius Crassus who saved the battle for him. In the campaign against the maritime tribes, basically it was Decimus Brutus' effective use of naval forces that won the campaign. When Caesar took over the naval forces for the campaigns to Britannia he basically blew it and almost lost his best units because of it. It pretty much went like that in all his campaigns, with good subordinates making up for Caesar's mistakes. By the time he entered the Civil War then, Caesar's success is that he had a battle-hardened veteran force, well trained and well commanded, against an army composed primarily of raw recruits and some very poor officers. Pompeius I think was a better general, but was hampered in the CW with poor subordinates and political divisions. Labienus outgeneraled Caesar in North Africa and in Spain, effectively utilizing what he had available. There were a number of things that came into play in his campaigns, but often it just came down to Caesar being lucky things went his way.

As a soldier I don't think I would have preferred serving under Caesar. His mistakes cost too many losses to his own men, and Caesar's answer to his problems was to commit his men in frontal butchery. One advantage the Roman army had over the Gauls is that its tactics allowed relief of the line, so that Roman units had greater endurance in a battle, but Caesar often pushed that to limits he should not have. He rarely used covering forces, supporting forces, or manuever to achieve his objectives. For example in Britannia and against the Nervii he sent out foraging parties (because he had to on account of his neglect of logistics) without a covering force. I can't think of any battle off hand where he used his light infantry as skirmishers. At Ilerda his one legion managed to get to the city gates and over the walls while Caesar watched, never sending support or reinforcements, and thus they were repulsed. In Britannia, Italy, North Africa, Alexandria, Spain, Caesar rushed headlong with forces on hand, not waiting to consolidate his forces or properly supply them, which got him into situations that he should have avoided, and since he did not, it needlessly cost his men their lives. That is not a good general.
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Postby Horatius Piscinus on Sat Jun 12, 2004 1:52 pm

Salvete

It is hard to argue against success, and Caesar did prove successful. That does not mean however that he was a good general. There are many factors that come into play in battle, and even more when one looks at the occurances of a war. A number of military historians and commentators have criticized Caesar as a general, and have noted his uncommon luck. As a child I was told that "The Gods watch over children and fools," and Caesar was no child. But don't just take my word for Caesar's having been favoured by the Gods. This below is something else I posted in AW.




If you do not care for the assessment of Caesar as a general by Napoleon or Fuller, then why not look at what his contemporaries had to say, or why not look at Caesar himself? To what did Caesar attribute his success?

In Britania: "unable to pursue very far because our cavalry had not been able to hold their course and reach Britain; this was the one thing that prevented me from enjoying my usual good fortune (BG 4.26)."

In Greece, Caesar cut off through his own ineptitude, desperate for supplies and reinforcements, Marc Antony managed to sail to his relief by reaching Nymphaeum only because a change in wind direction at the critical moment allowed Antony to make port and threw the opposing Rhodian fleet onto rocks. Caesar's assessment, "An incredible stroke of luck, a sudden reversal of fortune, ... and so, with the change of circumstances, the storm protected our ships while battering the Rhodian ships" (CW 3.27).

How did Caesar assess his own performance at the battle on the Lesnikia?

"They (Pompeius) did not reflect that the reasons for their success were the small numbers of our men [i.e. Caesar's failure to employ a sufficient force for the task], the difficulty of the terrain [i.e. the enemy?s trenchlines and ramparts], the confined space (the camp being already occupied) [i.e. the enemy had actually dared to occupy their own fortifications making it too crowded for Caesar's men to maneuver inside its walls], the two-fold fear of attack both from inside and outside [i.e. Caesar's ill prepared and undermanned assault got caught in a trap of their own making] and the fact our army was split in two and one part could not help the other [i.e. uncoordinated attacks lacking support]. They did not consider, further, that there had been no decisive encounter, no battle [ which is why Caesar then had to abandon his entire 8 mile line around Pompey's forces?] and that our men, owing to their numbers and confined space, had inflicted more damage on themselves than they had received from the enemy [yes, not properly supported or commanded, Caesar's army panicked when they realized their situation and stampeded over themselves, even when Caesar personally intervened by grabbing up one of their standards. The signifer abandoned the eagle and Caesar]. Finally they did not recall how things commonly happen in war, how small causes, like false alarm or sudden panic or religious scruple, had often inflicted great damage, how often through the inadequacy of a commander [i.e. Caesar] or the fault of a tribune an army had come to grief." In other words, Caesar's usual good fortune on this occasion did not overcome his poor generalship. And the result, as Caesar said himself, he had been forced to abandon his earlier plans ... all at once he withdrew all of his garrisons and abandoned the blockade" (CW 3.72-3).

Time and again Caesar placed his command into desperate situations because he failed to abide by the common principles of war, and even Caesar admits, time and again throughout his Commentaries that it was only luck that saved him. After the battle on the Lesnikia Caesar exhorted his legions. "Thank Fortuna," he said, " that we took Italy without bloodshed; thank Fortuna that we pacified the two Spanish provinces against a most warlike foe under experienced and practiced generals; thank Fortuna that we have brought into our control the neighboring provinces, which supply us with grain. Finally, consider how lucky we have been in that." (CW 3.73)
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Comparison

Postby C.AeliusEricius on Tue Jun 22, 2004 11:41 pm

The faults that you cite in Caesar, how different was the conduct of his contemporaries? Caesar is the Roman whose militatry memoires we have, others of his period are second hand accounts, and Caesar's are [almost] extent, so much weight is given them. That said I've wondered at some of his lapses. At least ;apses from the view of this amateur student of things military, yet I've reminded myself that I do not know if his contemporaries handeled things much different. In 55 bce [for a marker date] the "Romen Army" was different than in 15 bce. Your own beloved logistical concerns would be a definite point of difference. There was an actual supply system those forty years later. So was Caesar actually just as incompetent as his fellow generals, only more lucky? Luck can swing a blance, but it is very difficult for it to knock all the way over.

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Postby Horatius Piscinus on Wed Jun 23, 2004 12:18 pm

Salve Erici

Skill and luck are needed to be successful in battle. Read the memoirs of soldiers in any era and you will see how confusing things are, how absurd things occur, and what role simple luck plays. Caesar I think was uncommonly lucky compared to his contemporaries. His skill improved with experience.

Throughout his career, Pompey was a much better general than any of his contemporaries. Rome recognized this and thus he achieved military recognition before his political career began. In the CW he had a number of difficulties due to Roman politics and their military system. But I think better than most he knew the short comings of the Roman military system and how to overcome them. Caesar had a definite problem in Gaul with this. The major shortcoming of the Roman military in that period was that it had no cavalry. They relied on auxiliaries which could be quite different from place to place. Gaul did not have very good cavalry compared to other regions. Even in that though, Caesar did not employ his cavalry effectively at times. Pompey had more diverse cavalry and, I think, used his better. Logistics, Caesar did not seem to pay much attention too, and it got him in trouble at times. Pompeius was not innovative with his logistics but handled them better, in that he kept his organized.

Tactically the Roman system was superior to anything they faced, except maybe the Parthians. If Caesar had lived to go to Parthia it would have been interesting. In Africa he was almost annihilated by Labienus' skillful use of Numidian cavalry. The Parthians employed similar tactics, so Caesar would have been better prepared than had been Crassus. I do not think Caesar was tactically skillful. He used the system he had, often put it under stress that a better general might not have. He had to change things somewhat when he faced Labienus, and that is the one time I recall where he did adapt to the situation rather than rely on frontal assault.

His other opponents in the CW were incompetent. They hindered Pompey and Labienus and made Caesar look good. Ariovistus was a better general than Caesar. Labienus was an excellent commander, but he never was placed in command of an entire campaign so it is difficult to say how he would do. Publius Crassus seems to have been a good junior officer. He served Caesar with distinction, and served his father well, considering the situation he was in there. Marc Antony was an excellent subordinant. He was the bright spot in Caesar's army against Pompey. Comparing Caesar, in his later career, to Antony, Caesar was probably better. Against Octavius, Antony did not have the officer corps available that Octavius had, and Octavius was wise enough to rely on them.

Comparing Caesar to other ancient generals, he does not stack up to Hannibal, not close to Alexander, and there were a number of other Greek generals far better than Caesar. Earlier Roman generals, I don't know where you would begin to compare. Sylla, Marius, Marcellus, Scipio, Paullus, probably Caesar wouldn't do well in comparison to any of them. Really I would need to look closer before I could give an opinion.

For the moment I have been looking at Caesar's handling of combined operations where he employed naval forces with his army. So I'll have more for you to look at later. For now though, I am going to be busy for the next couple of weeks.

Vale optime
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Postby Marcus Pomponius Lupus on Thu Jun 24, 2004 1:05 pm

Salve Piscine,

scripsisti

He used the system he had, often put it under stress that a better general might not have. He had to change things somewhat when he faced Labienus, and that is the one time I recall where he did adapt to the situation rather than rely on frontal assault.


What about the battle at Pharsalus then ? Caesar effectively defeated Pompeius there by luring his cavalary into a trap, from what I know about that battle, Caesar seemed very able to adapt to the situation. (there's a thread in col mil about "Time Commanders", where I've given a brief outline of his strategy)

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Postby Horatius Piscinus on Thu Jun 24, 2004 8:02 pm

Salve Lupe

I don't think Caesar's deployment at Pharsalia was a trap particularly, and it was not a feint. A common tactic was to place cavalry on the flanks as a screen. Caesar was lacking in cavalry at this battle, since his one flank was covered by the river, using all his cavalry to screen his other flank simply made sense. It was a reasonable expectation that Pompeius' cavalry would defeat his own cavalry. Caesar had about 1,000 cavalry against Popmpeius 11-22,000. The nature of their cavalry and the tactics they used were quite different. Cavalry in those days were ineffective in attacking against infantry, so long as they could not get around the infantry's flanks, while infantry formations could always chase off cavalry with a concerted attack. Cavalry was mobile but lacked the ability of making shock attacks, since they didn't have stirrups. Placing infantry in support of his cavalry was a natural decision, and this was especially so for Caesar as he had seen how his opponents used cavalry combined with infantry in Spain and Gaul.

The real advantage Caesar had at Pharsalia, as in much of the Civil War, was that he had more veteran legions. They were capable of dealing with numerical superiority when faced by unorganized barbarians or raw recruits. And that is the case in any war. Although out numbered in men, he really had a superiority in combat effectiveness. I will have to go over the battle more, however, before lending an opinion of the details.

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Oh, and a happy Midsummer's Day to everyone :D
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Postby Horatius Piscinus on Sat Jun 26, 2004 12:51 pm

Salve Lupe

Yesterday I read through Caesar's account of the battle along with some other material, so now I can offer you a better opinion. Caesar had a good day.

Pharsalia

The main account we possess of the battle of Pharsalia comes from Caesar, which lacks several details. Other accounts by later authors provide some additional details, from which we can assume that other participants had left their own accounts. Even Caesar refers to events inside the camp of Pompeius that he learned after the battle. Still our knowledge of what happened that day is limited, and so some details have to be filled out by reasoned assumptions. Historians are not even agreed upon the exact location of the battlefield as Caesar provides no indication of where the battle was fought. Plutarch, Appian, Polyaenus and Suetonius placed the battle near Pharsalia. Hirtius, Frontius, Eutropius and Orosius claimed it was fought seven miles further west near Palaepharsalia. Both of these towns, however, lie south of the Enipeus River, where the battle was fought along its northern banks. From the accounts, Caesar had 22,000 men deployed in 80 cohorts, making up about seven legions. (Legiones IX and VIII had suffered so many casualties earlier that they were combined to form one unit smaller than a legion in size, and cohorts pulled from each legion formed another force comparable to an understrength legion.) He was supported by 1,000 cavalry. Pompeius had eleven legions of various quality, composed of 47,000 men in 110 cohorts, supported by a variety of cavalry units that came to roughly 10,000.

In spite of his numerical advantage, at Pharsalia Pompeius had certain disadvantages in the combat effectiveness of his individual legions and in his command structure. His tactical deployment can be criticized at several points, whereby he did not make full use of the advantages he held and even reduced the overall combat effectiveness of his overall army. To begin with, his legions were deployed in standard formation of ten men deep in three lines. On average his legions had a little more than 4,000, while Caesar had an average of a little under 4,000 men per legion. Because his units were already understrength, and because he had pulled out a cohort from each to form a special unit in reserve, Caesar's three lines were only six men deep. This worked to Caesar's advantage in two ways. First was the fact that in spite of his numerical inferiority, Caesar managed to form his legions into a line that was about the same length if not longer than that of Pompeius. About one Roman mile each. Pompeius had a clear advantage in cavalry, which he proposed to utilize by massing it on his left flank to sweep around Caesar's right. However he may have done better to try to use his numerical advantage to gain Caesar's flank, and this would also have supplied his cavalry with infantry support, which ultimately proved to be necessary.

The second advantage Caesar gained from his thinned lined is a little more difficult to explain. It involves the intangible of battlefield morale. We can contrast the potential battlefield morale of Caesar?s troops to those of Pompeius by considering a number of factors. First is that Caesar had a real advantage in the number of veteran units. Both armies had nearly the same number. Pompeius placed two veteran legions on his right, another two veteran legions on his left, with one veteran legion and some veteran Spanish cohorts in his center. These were separated by placing six less reliable units of new recruits between his three divisions. A problem that can occur in battle, especially in linear warfare such as the Romans fought, is that rear elements not directly engaged with the enemy may decide to run when things begin to look bad. The Roman tactical system compensated for this problem by placing its most experienced men of each legion in the third line, which was also its thinnest line. We do not really hear from Caesar how this may have influenced the battle, but I suspect that what happened is that when the veteran units on Pompeius' left were outflanked, the rear elements of the inexperienced legions between the left and center began to withdraw. This would have led to the front elements of the same legions then withdrawing as well, causing a chain reaction all along the Pompeian front. Caesar's seasoned legions, with thinner lines, probably was using their second line more frequently to relieve and support the front ranks. This meant that throughout the battle more of his men were actually engaged and had less time therefore to think about what was happening. Caesar?s third line were seasoned veterans and also older than the veterans Pompeius had. In this kind of warfare, as in 18th century warfare, seasoned professional in their late twenties to mid thirties tend to be more patient and sturdier in the face of an enemy. Even though a part of Caesar's line might suffer a temporary setback, the rear elements in other units were less likely to react by withdrawing. In addition Caesar had told these units prior to the battle that they were to await his command before advancing. In anticipation of his command, they were even less likely to withdraw and cause a general route as occurred with the Pompeian army.

Pompeius had deployed his army into its line formation before Caesar had ever left his camp. This allowed Caesar to consider his enemy's deployment, discern his plan and anticipate his maneuvers. Thus Caesar was able to deploy his army accordingly. Pompeius had a preponderance of cavalry. Placing all his cavalry on his left, along with all of his archers and slingers, made clear his intention. There was no doubt to the result as to what would happen with Caesar's cavalry when outnumbered 10 to 1. "Our cavalry failed to withstand their onslaught." Seeing the enemy's disposition from the start, Caesar had thus pulled a cohort from the third line of each legion to form a fourth line in support of his cavalry. This ad hoc unit of heavy infantry charged the Pompeian cavalry, not only pushing it back but also setting it to flight. This was to prove a decisive moment in the battle. How could a single line of roughly 1,600 infantry defeat an such overwhelming cavalry force? Caesar says that after defeating his own cavalry the Pompeian cavalry began to deploy in squadrons. This was probably an important detail, as Caesar's infantry was thereby able to attack each squadron separately. First it should be pointed out that cavalry attacking downhill as had Pompeius' is at a disadvantage. The nature of the horse is that it does better galloping uphill rather than downhill. This was a factor in the charge of the Heavy Brigade at Balaclava against a superior force of Russian cavalry. Also the distance that horses can charge is not very far, only about 2-300 meters. Even though the Pompeian cavalry had reached level ground before Caesar's infantry attacked, its horses were probably already in an exhausted state. Secondly cavalry units tend to become disrupted in a charge and after defeating the Caesarian cavalry would need to reorganize. By saying they began to deploy into squadrons, Caesar may indicate that the Pompeian cavalry was still in the process of sorting out their individual units when the infantry attacked. Thirdly cavalry of this era lacked an ability to make shock attacks as could heavy infantry, and it could not withstand the shock attack of heavy infantry. We have some idea of the various squadrons in the Pompeian cavalry - 600 Galatians, 500 Cappadicians, 500 Thracians, 200 Macedonians, 500 Gauls and Germans, 200 Syrian mounted archers, 800 of Pompeius' slaves and herdsmen, and then 3,400 Dardani, Bessi, Thessalians and others. Thus as Caesar's infantry came upon each squadron in turn, they actually had a numerical advantage as well as a tactical advantage. Caesar had thus managed, whether by design or by chance, to effect an economy of force with a massed force on a series of critical points of exhausted and disorganized enemy units, defeating them in detail. The infantry needed only to charge each squadron in turn, and before they even reached the cavalry, the squadron would turn in flight. Just as happened with the Russian cavalry at Balaclava, unit cohesion had transformed into a herd effect so that as soon as any of the cavalry in a squadron would turn, the entire unit turned. Some of these cavalry squadrons, like that of Pompeius' slaves, probably fled as soon as they saw their fellow cavalry squadrons put to flight. Thus the Caesarian infantry did not need to attack the Pompeian cavalry as a massed unit, taking on each squadron in turn, but the effect of its attack did affect the entire Pompeian cavalry as a single entity. This would seem to have been the case as Caesar said, "they all turned," almost as a single moment. With the cavalry dispersed from the field, Pompeius? archers and slingers, some 4,200 men, "unarmed and unprotected," were then massacred by Caesar's heavy infantry. This seems rather incredible; that such a large force could be trapped in such a way that they were all killed as Caesar claimed. But again, in this era, light infantry had little chance to stand against a concerted charge of heavy infantry, and probably they fled the field as well.

How both generals deployed their men stands in stark contrast. Pompeius had 2,000 beneficarii that he distributed throughout his line. The beneficarii were former soldiers recalled to duty and others in his command who had previously been rewarded for outstanding performance. They offered Pompeius a kind of cadre that could be used to hold his raw recruits together. We don?t know if that is in fact how he used them, only that we are told he dispersed them throughout the units in his line. Caesar instead appears to have used some task forcing during the battle. First, he formed his fourth line by withdrawing some of the better cohorts from each legion, concentrating them for a special assignment. Caesar also mentions Crastinus who was a recalled veteran, a beneficarius, "who the previous year had been chief centurion of Legio X, a man of outstanding valour." Crastinus led a party of 120 specially selected men in a crack unit that preceded Legio X into battle. We are not told exactly what their mission was. It was too small of a unit to act as a screening force for the legion, and not the kind of force that would perform such duty anyway. If their mission was to seize some position in preparation of the legion?s assault, we are not told what it was or why it was important. It is possible that they were sent as a spearhead that in spite of their few number could have disrupted the front rank of the opposing legion. Whatever their mission, we know that they succeeded and that Crastinus died in the effort. Crastinus is an example of Caesar task forcing, concentrating his better men into crack units for special assignments.

The most decisive factor in Caesar's victory, imho, came with Caesar's command and control over his army. Caesar had posted himself behind the center legions where he could watch the battle as it developed. Seeing his cavalry defeated, he gave the prearranged signal for his ad hoc infantry force to attack the Pompeian cavalry. Then when this force had gained Pompeius' left flank, Caesar gave another prearranged signal to his third line. At a critical moment the third line advanced on Pompeius' infantry line, pinning it in place so that it could not react to the attack on its left by sending reinforcements to counter Caesar?s maneuver. Caesar had retained command and control over his entire force, coordinating its movements into a single effort. In contrast Pompeius had a command structure that divided into several separate commands. Pompeius took personal command of the two legions on the left. Scipio had his own two Syrian legions in the center. Lentulus commanded the legions on the right and Labienus the cavalry force. No one had overall command of the six legions of raw recruits that were interspersed between these divisions, and thus each division was isolated from one another. Also by placing himself with his legions on the left, Pompeius had taken himself out of effective command of his entire army. No one was conducting the Pompeian army with an over all command at that point. Further the various divisions would unlikely have cooperated with one another on their own, since their commanders were in competition with one another over what offices they should receive after defeating Caesar. Both Scipio and Lentulus had laid claim to Caesar's office of pontifex maximus, and a bitter argument was held between them on the night before the battle. It was such bitter divisiveness between his subordinates in the first place that had forced Pompeius to abandon his strategy. Pompeius had been successfully out maneuvering Caesar, holding him in place by taking up defensive positions and forcing Caesar to then withdraw as his supplies ran low. This was exactly what Caesar had first set out to do that day, withdraw due to logistical problems. Pompeius decided instead to attack and finish Caesar through battle rather than attrition, and this decision can only have resulted from the problems he was facing within his own command. The effect on the Pompeian infantry line was thus the same as occurred with the Pompeian cavalry. The legions on Pompeius? left were taken in flank, and even before they were defeated Pompeius himself left the field. Likely, when the raw recruits between the left and center saw this, they began to flee. The other raw recruit legions between the center and right probably were the next to abandon the field. Their flanks thus exposed, engaged on their front, and Caesar?s legions now threatening their rear as well, Scipio at the center probably decided to turn, and with him the legions on the right under Lentulus. Each of Pompeius? divisions were essentially independent commands, left uncoordinated in their efforts through the lack of an over all commander. Caesar on the other hand retained unity of command over his army that allowed his legions to become mutually supporting and coordinate their attacks into a single effort.

Strategically Pompeius had performed better in the campaign that led up to Pharsalia. Whether he should have offered battle at this occasion was not strategically necessary. There were tactical flaws in his deployment of troops for the battle and in his plan of attack. Critical to the outcome was the flaw in Pompeius' divided command structure. Tactically Caesar performed much better at the battle itself. The result was not simply that Caesar had won and Pompeius had lost, and there was no simple cause for the result. There was a combination of factors, not all of which we can possibly know. What is clear is that both generals applied the basic principles of war, the one better than the other. Pompeius massed his cavalry, but not in a manner that adhered to the principle of an economy of force, did not task force his cavalry wing as he might have done and thereby failed to provide much needed support at the critical point to his plan. These failures were complicated further by the lack of command and control exercised by Pompeius. Caesar's army, although on the surface seemingly at a disadvantage numerically, was in fact the superior combat force. That was due to several factors, not least of which was the superior command structure of his individual units even below his centurions. Caesar capitalized on his advantages by proper application of several principles of war. Most important was Caesar's exercise of command and control over his entire command throughout the battle. The divided command of the Pompeian army led to its being defeated piecemeal, while unity of command allowed the Caesarian army to mass superior forces at critical points at critical moments in the engagement. Caesar's was a concerted effort against an ill organized and ill prepared foe, and the result was due more to Caesar's ability than to the failures of Pompeius.
M Horatius Piscinus

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Postby Anonymous on Mon Sep 13, 2004 5:13 am

Ave,
Errrr......aren't you being a little harsh on Caesar? The 7th Legion went foraging without even setting up a basic defesive perimeter or a casual scouting into the woods that lined the wheat fields. The woods were bristling with Britons and they had a chariot force just across the ridge. With his forces garrisoned themselves after the SNAFU landings (I think it was a certain Quaestor Volusenous who chose the site) it was necessary that legions went around foraging....carefully. This sort of legwork didn't need the direct supervision of Caesar himself, the Legions themselves had to take the necessary steps. In fact Caesar was disappointed with the 7th Legion after this incident and they could redeem themselves only during the second invasion.
Pharsalus was not a major victory...but it was sort of decisive. The republicans and their allies were scattered after the war. They lost Ahenorarbus and a good deal of experienced cavalry, archers and slingers brought over by Labienus when the left flank was annihilated. Pompey himself admits that he didn't have much faith in the allied troops and he had just two veteran legion with him, viz. I and III Legions....he put all bets on Labienus's cavalry. Caesar simply outgeneralled Pompey in his brilliant move of disguising his cohorts to form the 4th line and thus mowing down the enemy cavalry and the left wing. Only the I Legion on the extreme right escaped almost unscathed from this battle while the III Legion ground itself to death against Caesar's veterans.
Ruspinia is another matter though.....I wonder what would have happened if Scipio and Juba continued the attack well into the night and Labienus didn't play Lord Haw Haw against the X Legion..... Another Carrhae maybe?
Maybe his few mistakes were just a manifestation of Caears's audacity and his impatience. He relied on surprise, careful recklessness(oxymoron eh?), initial momentum and adaptablity......and it worked for him. His personality, strength and no retreat-no surrender mentallity helped too.....Lusitania, Sambre, Gergovia, Alesia, Ruspinia, Alexandria and Munda are good pointers to this. Few others would have had the determination, capacity to see the big picture or the prescience he showed in Alesia, Pharsalus, Pyrennes and scores of other battles. The way he turned his veteran legions' revolt around and charmed the pompeian survivors to his side right after Pharsalus shows his skill in the hearts and minds war. If all these aren't indicators of a good general, then what are?
And Caesar wasn't always lucky too...the first invasion on Britian was hampered by gale and winds, his African campaign was delayed due to logistic and natural reasons, he had to fight the civil war entirely on Pompey country, he had his share of bungling subordinates(Antonius for instance)...

Marius Sandrocottus.
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