by Horatius Piscinus on Mon Feb 03, 2003 4:16 am
Salvete
Mi Curio, I don't follow you at all. I agree that any military leader with experience would have preferred to go against the Belgae. Not because of the difference in foes, but due to the difficulty of moving and supplying a force cross channel.
From what Caesar wrote, he had six legions, plus two legions of raw recruits. He had been in Cisapline Gaul campaigning for his candidates, sending voters down to Rome to vote, meanwhile leaving Labienus to oversee military operations in Gaul over the winter. He posed that facing him was a force of 250, 000 Belgae. Add in his allies and Caesar still claims he was outnumbered at least two to one. Why then would you place your force across river, with a small rear guard to watch your one possible line of retreat? As things turned out the Belgae did attempt to cross the river further down stream and cut Caesar off. He acknowledged that if they had succeeded taking the bridge that his army would have been cut off from their sources of supply. But he was lucky.
Then he moved further into the enemy territory. Still facing a numerically superior force, if true, who's position was unknown. He advanced with his legions formed, the six veteran units in the front, then his baggage train, with two legions of raw recruits bringing up the rear to act as his reserve? Not smart. Not if that is what he did, and I would think it was somewhat different than as simply as he said. Caesar tries to make it appear as though he knew of the Belgian plan to ambush him, and that by placing his baggage train further back in his column that he was able to win the day. It probably was a surprise to the Belgae that they had managed to catch the bulk of Caesar's forces in a trap. The description he gives is that he was surprised, he was ambushed, the enemy got into his camp with his men unprepared, he had to "be everywhere at once", which really only shows that he had lost control of his command. What Caesar admits to is not the campiagn conducted by a military mastermind, or even a field commander who showed any tactical genius. He was lucky.
Then he decided to split his forces before venturing deeper into enemy territory. He was very lucky. But not militarily wise.
There was obviously more to it. Numerical advantage historically has never been decisive, it does not necessarily translate into superior force. Then as now, what matters is superior firepower. Caesar had that, certainly in a seige situation, and you see him rush forward his Numidian archers and Baeleric slingers in detachtments to drive off the Belgae. In a melee battle, in a sense, the Roman tactical deployment gave them superior "fire" power, by artificially increasing their frontage and battlefield mobility, enabling them to bring a superior portion of their force to bear against an enemy. Press a Roman formation onto itself, though, as Hannibal did at Cannae, and the Romans lost their tactical advantage.
What realy helped Caesar out, in Britannia and in Belgium, were the native tribes that sided with him. Caesar was a good politicial, and diplomat, and it paid off for him. But militarily, Caesar did not demonstrate much ability.
Valvete
Moravius Piscinus
M Horatius Piscinus
Sapere aude!