by Marcus Tullius Ioannes on Sun Mar 23, 2008 3:22 pm
Salve omnes.
What I find striking about Epicurus' view of living according to nature is its profound materialism. As I read him, he believes that all we can know is derived from the senses. Therefore, it is impossible to conceive of virtue, for example, or the good life, in any way that is not ultimately founded in what we can see, feel, taste, hear. Also, since having died we no longer sense anything, and death renders us nothing, and nothing is, so to speak, nothing to fear.
It follows from this premise, I think, that the good life is necessarily one which feels "good." So, the absence of pain is necessary to the good life. Over indulgence in pleasures brings pain, physical and emotional, and even mental. Therefore, an epicurean does not over indulge, and instead lives a life of contentment.
Stoics seem to arrive at a similar view of the good life, but Epictetus, at least, does so I think through a consideration of freedom in a very broad sense (not surprisingly in the case of a former slave). There are things outside of our control, and if we desire them or fear them those who control them control us, and if we strive for them or allow them to effect us emotionally we will never be at peace. So, they should be matters of indifference to us, and the good life can be lived only by focusing on what is in our control.
So far so good, I think, from a common sense standpoint. But how are we to use those things within our control to live according to nature, and how is that "good"? Setting ourselves free from the things we cannot control will certainly make us more content. It is less likely that we will be subject to emotional pain, and so passes an epicurean test as contributing to the good life. But stoics do not accept epicureanism, and require something more to define living according to nature. Here I think stoicism faces difficulties of explanation that epicureanism need not face due to its very simplicity.
It is necessary for the stoic to believe in something beyond what we can know from the five senses as a basis for a philosophy of life. Considerations similar to the argument from design seem to lead stoics like Marcus Aurelius to infer the existence of a divine will or reason guiding the fate of the world. Would the great architect of the universe having created humans want them to live in misery? No, and to avoid living in misery in it necessary to detach ourselves from the things we cannot control, and to use what we can control in a virtuous manner (a possible stoic response). But, this argument is necessarily circular, at least to the extent it is used to justify a life of virtue.
Philosophia est ars vitae